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COMPANY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF THE IMPACT OF THE EU FREEDOMS OF 
ESTABLISHMENT AND CAPITAL AND THE 
U.S. INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
CHRISTOPH ALLMENDINGER 
ABSTRACT 
Since the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Centros 
case, it has become popular in company law to draw comparisons between 
the United States economic constitution and the Single European Market. 
Since then, fears of a European “Delaware Effect,” which would create a 
“race to the bottom,” have hounded the debate on European company 
law. In this discussion, however, the unique constitutional framework of 
both the EU and the U.S. is seldom regarded. This constitutional frame-
work, nevertheless, determines the behavior of both the legislators at state 
level and the market participants. This Article compares the impact of two 
major principles of both constitutions on company law: the U.S. dormant 
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Freedom of Establishment and the 
Freedom of Capital in the EU Treaties. The Article finds that the U.S. 
constitutional framework is more lenient on states and thereby grants 
them broader discretion to regulate company law. Further, it will argue 
that this is rooted in the specific legal set-up of the two common markets. 
The European Single Market, unlike the U.S., grants explicit free move-
ment rights to capital and direct investments, establishing a modern frame-
work. Further, European legal doctrine is faced with the paradox that the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) equates natural 
persons and companies, whereas in reality, companies differ from natural 
persons in many respects. The U.S. constitutional framework instead relies 
on the concept that companies are creatures of state law in order to grant 
states larger powers. 
                                                 
 Attorney-at-Law (Germany) at the Frankfurt-based law firm Hengeler Mueller, 
Ruprecht-Karls-University of Heidelberg graduate 2007, LL.M. in European Law, London 
School of Economics and Political Sciences 2009. The views expressed are those of the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Single European Market has been compared to the economic consti-
tution of the United States of America since the early days of the European 
common market project.1 The U.S. and the EU, it is said,2 share the same prob-
lem. The individual states in the U.S. and the Member States of the EU try to 
secure their own advantage at the cost of one another in the superstructure.3 
Comparing the U.S. economic constitution and the Single European 
Market became popular in company law when the ECJ in Centros pro-
nounced that regulatory competition was inherent in the system of the 
treaty.4 Since then, fears of a European “Delaware Effect,” which would 
bring about a “race to the bottom,” have hounded the debate in European 
company law.5 However, both common markets have a specific constitu-
tional framework, which determines the behavior of both the legislators at 
state level and the market participants. These differences are decisive on 
the extent to which the states are limited in their ability to ensure their own 
policy interests at the expense of the interests of the common market. In 
the Single European Market, the four market freedoms prohibit the Member 
States from taking action against the free movement of production factors 
(Article 26 TFEU).6 In terms of company law, the Freedom of Establish-
ment and the Freedom of Capital are most important. The U.S. constitu-
tional framework for companies is more multifaceted. At the very outset, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause7 is not applicable to companies, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court rejects the concept of a corporate citizen.8 Accord-
ing to the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, corporations “are creatures 
                                                 
1 P. Leleux, Corporation Law in the United States and in the E.E.C., 5 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 133 (1967). 
2 Klaus Lackhoff, Restrictions on State Interference with Commerce in the U.S.A. and 
the EC, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 313 (1996). 
3 Id. 
4 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, ¶ 27; 
Case C-212/97, Opinion of AG La Pergola in Centros Ltd. v. Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen, 
1999 E.C.R. I-1461, ¶ 20; see Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law—A Comparison 
of the United States and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2002). 
5 ERIK WERLAUFF, EU-COMPANY LAW—COMMON BUSINESS LAW OF 28 STATES 100 
(2d ed. 2003). 
6 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 26, 
Sept. 5, 2008 O.J. (C 115/59) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”). 
8 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 175 (1869); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 
586 (1839). 
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of local law and have not even an absolute right of recognition in other 
States, but depend for that and for the enforcement of their contracts upon 
the assent of those States, which may be given accordingly on such terms 
as they please.”9 The Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV, Section 1 
of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
in each state to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every 
other State.”10 Of all constitutional principles, the dormant Interstate 
Commerce Clause, which restricts the states from laying burdens on inter-
state commerce, is most comparable to the four freedoms.11 
Therefore, this Article will compare the impact the dormant Interstate 
Commerce Clause has on company law in the United States with the im-
pact the Freedom of Establishment and Freedom of Capital have on na-
tional company law in the EU. 
The Interstate Commerce Clause is worth comparing with the EU 
Freedoms of Establishment and Capital in respect to company law for two 
reasons. Firstly, the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause is able to restrict 
the states’ abilities to regulate freely companies incorporated in their terri-
tory and therefore governed by domestic law.12 In this regard, the question 
arises, to what extent do the states have to respect the Interstate Commerce 
Clause in company law and how much discretion remains to the states as the 
company’s creator, as companies do not exist naturally but are “creatures 
of national law.”13 This question, however, is not unique to the legal frame-
work for company law in the United States but is one of the most debated 
questions in European company law as well.14 Secondly, the dormant Inter-
state Commerce Clause in its function limits the powers of the states, not 
only towards the Congress but also towards the market participants.15 In 
that sense, it forms a “status negativus”—a right of every citizen against 
state interference in the interstate commerce of the market subjects.16 The 
dormant Interstate Commerce Clause therefore is an economic freedom. 
                                                 
9 Paul, 75 U.S. at 170. 
10 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
11 Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, RULES AND INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING A LAW 
MARKET: VIEWS FROM THE U.S. AND EUROPE 20–21 (University of Illinois Law Sch. Law 
& Economics Working Papers, No. 88, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100277. 
12 See Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
13 Case C-81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 
ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483 at ¶ 19. 
14 Case C-210/06, Cartesio Okató és Szolgáltató Bt., 2008 E.C.R. I-9641 at ¶ 104; 
Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. 5483 at ¶ 19. 
15 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1. 
16 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 2 (1910). 
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This function brings the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause in close 
agreement with the freedoms of movement of the EU Treaties.17 
First, this Article will discuss the basic principles of the constitutional 
set-up of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause and the Freedom of Es-
tablishment and Freedom of Capital. The second section will address more 
precise problems. It will compare the inbound situation—the approach of 
both constitutional frameworks toward the regulation of foreign compa-
nies by host states. The third section will assess the so-called outbound 
situation, namely, how far the two principles force the states to create their 
companies in a common-market friendly way and thereby limit the discre-
tion of the states in regulating domestic company law. In the light of the 
results of the assessment, a further section will argue that the U.S. consti-
tutional framework is more lenient on states, thereby granting them broad-
er discretion to regulate company law. By offering an explanation for this 
more lenient approach, this Article will consider the lessons that may be 
drawn for European company law from U.S. American experience and 
legal debate. It will present the argument that this result is rooted in the 
specific legal set-up of the two common markets; unlike the U.S. constitu-
tional framework, Europe’s different minimum capital requirements offer in-
centives to create pseudo-foreign companies. The Single European Market, 
unlike the U.S., grants explicit free movement rights to capital and direct 
investments, establishing a modern framework. Finally, European legal 
doctrine is faced with the paradox that the TFEU equates natural persons 
and companies, whereas companies differ from natural persons in reality 
in many respects. The U.S. constitutional framework instead relies on the 
thought that companies are creatures of state law in order to grant states 
larger powers. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF COMPANY LAW 
Like every field of law, company law exists within a constitutional 
framework. In the United States, company law evolved at a time when the 
federal constitutional framework was already in place.18 In Europe, it was 
national constitutional law and national legal tradition in opposition to Eu-
ropean law that determined the development of company law.19 Later, the 
                                                 
17 See Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastigen, 
1963 E.C.R. at ¶ 5 (precluding the direct application of the four freedoms). 
18 See RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & K. J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE, 28–29 (Cappalletti et al. eds., 1988). 
19 See Brian Cheffins, European Community Company and Securities Law: A Canadian 
Perspective, 36 MCGILL L. J. 1282, 1294 (1991). 
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European integration formed a new constitutional framework for company 
law, first in the form of the Treaty of Rome provisions, and today in the 
Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.20 This European constitutional framework of company 
law co-exists with the constitutional frameworks at a national level.21 This 
section will describe the constitutional frameworks of the U.S. and the EU 
and evaluate their differences and commonalities. 
A. Balance of Power 
1. The Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause 
The Constitution of the United States provides for a division of powers, 
not only in regard to the traditional state powers but also vertically be-
tween the federation and the states.22 First of all, the residual legislative 
powers are given to the states, and the powers of the federation are limited 
to those delegated by the constitution.23 Article I, Sections 8 and 10 dele-
gate these limited powers to the Congress as the federal lawmaker.24 The 
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly states: “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”25 
Additionally, the federation has to ensure that the residual power given to the 
states is not used by the states to render meaningless the powers of the fed-
eral lawmakers.26 In this regard, Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution 
explicitly states that the laws made in accordance with the Constitution shall 
be the supreme law of the land.27 The Constitution does not explicitly pro-
hibit the states from using their legislative power in relation to subjects 
over which the Congress has not yet exercised its powers.28 However, case 
law established that the competences given to the Congress entail a nega-
tive effect on the ability of states to regulate in that area.29 
One of the most hard-fought,30 and at the same time most important, 
powers of the Congress is laid down in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which 
                                                 
20 Id. at 1286–88. 
21 See BUXBAUM & HOPT, supra note 18, at 174–75. 
22 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 132–36 (3rd ed. 2000). 
23 Leleux, supra note 1, at 134. 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10. 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
26 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). 
27 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
29 See infra note 34. 
30 Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 313–14. 
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states: “Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce ... among the 
several states ....”31 This clause is commonly called the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.32 In accordance with the two principles of the vertical division of 
power in a federation, the Interstate Commerce Clause prohibits the Con-
gress legislating on commerce within the states.33 Secondly, the Interstate 
Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing regulatory burdens on 
interstate commerce.34 With respect to this second function, the Commerce 
Clause is called the “dormant” Interstate Commerce Clause.35 The aim of 
centralizing the power over interstate commerce was twofold: the efficient 
allocation of goods, labor, and investment as well as the allaying of the 
fear of trade wars.36 
2. The Four Freedoms in the EU 
A division of power between the institutions of the European Union and 
the member states exists in a strikingly similar manner. Most prominently, 
the principle of conferral of powers is a basic principle of European Union 
Law.37 The European Union has no section similar to Article I, Section 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution, in which all the competences of the EU are framed, 
but rather these are scattered throughout the TFEU. One of the central 
competences can, however, be found in Article 114 TFEU, giving the legi-
slative institutions of the EU the power to form a common market.38 As in 
the U.S. Constitution, the positive power of the legislative organs and the 
economic freedoms are connected like two sides of one coin. Article 114 
TFEU is explicit in regard to Article 26 TFEU, which defines the internal 
market as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services, and capital is assured in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Treaty.39 The four freedoms of movement are thus directly 
linked to the competences. The scope of the freedoms defines the scope of 
the competences.40 More specific competences can be found right next to 
                                                 
31 Id. at 313. 
32 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995). 
33 Leleux, supra note 1, at 135. 
34 Id.; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852); Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 
U.S. 1, 209 (1824); Freeman v. Herwitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982). 
35 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579. 
36 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259, 260 (13th ed. 1997). 
37 DAMIEN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 211 (2006). 
38 TFEU art. 114, at ¶ 1. 
39 Id. 
40 J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place, in THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE EU LAW 371 (Craig & Burca eds., 1999). 
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the provisions governing the free movement right.41 Regarding the Freedom 
of Establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and the Freedom of Capital (Article 63 
TFEU), both limitations of member states’ powers are followed by an explicit 
competence of the EU institutions to legislate in these areas in Article 50 and 
Article 64 (2) TFEU. Besides these similarities in structure and function, 
the aims of the rules are the same. As with the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
the EU freedoms are motivated by the aim to create an internal market 
(Article 26 TFEU), which provides for the optimal allocation of resources 
and production factors.42 
B. The Scope of the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause and the 
EU Freedoms 
1. The Scope of the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause 
As there is no textual basis for the dormant Interstate Commerce 
Clause, its scope remains contested.43 In sum, the dormant Interstate 
Commerce Clause restricts state law in three ways.44 Firstly, state laws 
discriminating “against the transactions of out-of-state actors in interstate 
markets”45 are prohibited. “Out-of-state actors are non-residents of the 
regulating state[s].”46 However, the scope is broadened to include discrim-
ination against corporations incorporated under the law of another state.47 
Secondly, even if there is no discrimination, state laws that are dis-
criminatory in effect and that favor local economic interests at the expense 
of out-of-state competitors have been invalidated under the dormant Inter-
state Commerce Clause.48 Thirdly, the dormant Interstate Commerce 
Clause prohibits laws that have no discriminatory effects whatsoever, but 
place an undue burden on interstate commerce.49 
                                                 
41 TFEU art. 2–6. 
42 Wolfgang Schön, The Mobility of Companies in Europe and the Organizational 
Freedom of Company Founders, 3 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 122, 125 (2006); GUNTHER, 
supra note 36, at 260. 
43 Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J. 
concurring). 
44 GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 270. 
45 Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 136 (1978). 
46 Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 320. 
47 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 320. 
48 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1976); Dean 
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1950). 
49 Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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From the beginning, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the application of 
these categories. Firstly, a distinction was made between direct and indi-
rect impact on interstate commerce.50 This was soon found to be only a 
label for actually balancing the local interests of the states with the national 
interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across the state.51 Today, 
a balancing test is used that takes into consideration the local interests of 
the state: 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.... If 
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of 
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course 
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it 
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities 
[(so-called Pike-Test)].52 
Finally, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not apply when Con-
gress approved the state legislation53 and where the state acts as a market 
participant.54 
2. The Scope of the EU Freedom of Establishment and Capital 
The similarities of the scope of the EU Freedoms and the dormant Inter-
state Commerce Clause are demonstrative. As in the case of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, the Freedom of Establishment first evolved as an anti-
discrimination rule.55 This can clearly be seen from the wording of Article 49 
paragraph 2 TFEU. “Freedom of establishment shall include the right to 
take up and pursue activities ... under the conditions laid down for its own na-
tionals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected ....”56 
This paragraph constitutes the original Freedom of Establishment, as it 
was already included in Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome (1957).57 The 
ECJ then quickly broadened the scope of the Freedom of Establishment. 
                                                 
50 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120–25 (1942). 
51 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
52 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v. 
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960), and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 325 U.S. 761 
(1945)); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982). 
53 GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 268; Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 324. 
54 GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 322; Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 324–25. 
55 TFEU art. 49, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 67 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
56 Id. 
57 Treaty of Rome, art. 52, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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The member states adjusted the treaty to this case law with the result that 
the current Treaty further provides that “restrictions on the freedom of estab-
lishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State shall be prohibited,” the wording now to be found in Article 49 TFEU.58 
A broad understanding of the Freedom of Establishment was already 
introduced by the ECJ under the Treaty of Rome, in its rulings in Klopp.59 
Here, a regulation of the Paris bar association, which provided that an ad-
vocate may establish chambers in one place only, was held to violate the 
Freedom of Establishment, even though this rule applied to all advocates 
regardless of their nationality.60 In Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 
the ECJ then defined the scope of the Freedom of Establishment as pre-
cluding “any national measure ... even though it is applicable without dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality, [which] is liable to hamper or to 
render less attractive the exercise by Community nationals, including 
those of the Member State which enacted the measure, of fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.”61 
This formula was consequently confirmed in the Gebhard decision.62 
However, the ECJ added a balancing test. 
[N]ational measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfill four 
conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they 
must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 
they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which 
they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it [(so-called Gebhard Test)].63 
Regarding the freedom of capital, the ECJ’s judgments rely on the 
same principles applied to the Freedom of Establishment and the other 
freedoms. Since 1994, when it became directly applicable, the freedom of 
capital, in turn, has prohibited any restriction.64 The ECJ repeatedly for-
mulated: “Even though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal 
treatment, they are liable to impede the acquisition of shares in the under-
takings concerned and to dissuade investors in other Member States from 
                                                 
58 TFEU art. 49, supra note 55. 
59 Case C-107/83, Opinion of AG Slynn in Ordre des avocats au Barreau de Paris v. 
Onno Klopp 1984 E.C.R. 2971. 
60 Id. 
61 Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I-1663, ¶ 32. 
62 Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori 
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165, ¶ 36. 
63 Id. ¶ 37. 
64 STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW  ¶ 667 (1st ed. 2007). 
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investing in the capital of those undertakings.”65 In Commission/Belgium, 
the ECJ further formulated: 
The free movement of capital ... may be restricted only by national 
rules which are justified ... by overriding requirements of the general 
interest and which are applicable to all persons and undertakings 
pursuing an activity in the territory of the host Member State. Fur-
thermore, in order to be so justified, the national legislation must be 
suitable for securing the objective which it pursues and must not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with the 
principle of proportionality.66 
The justifying tests under the EU Freedoms correlate strongly to the 
test applied by the U.S. Supreme Court since its judgment in Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc. Firstly, both tests apply only to measures that are not dis-
criminatory in nature.67 Secondly, the measure must aim at securing a pub-
lic interest.68 Thirdly, the measure in both jurisdictions must be suitable 
for achieving the public interest.69 Finally, the proportionality test under 
the Freedoms of Establishment and capital provide that the measure does 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the general interest.70 A 
similar condition exists in the Pike test.71 The extent of the burden on in-
terstate commerce will thereafter depend on whether it could be promoted 
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.72 
Besides these strong similarities, the Gebhard test sets a higher standard 
of control. First of all, the Gebhard test asks not only whether the state mea-
sure protects a local public interest, but also whether there is an imperative 
requirement of public interest.73 This requires the ECJ to decide if the pub-
lic interest pursued by the measure is compelling enough in order to justify 
the hindering effects on freedom. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court ap-
plies the necessity test in a much weaker form than the ECJ. Whereas the 
ECJ controls the suitability of the measures, the Pike test requires only that 
                                                 
65 See Case C-483/99, Comm’n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I-4781, ¶ 41; Case C-367/98, 
Comm’n v. Portugal, 2002 ECR I-4731, ¶ 45. 
66 Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809, ¶ 45; see also Comm’n v. 
France, 2002 E.C.R. I-4781 at ¶ 45; Comm’n v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. I-4731 at ¶ 49. 
67 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Case C-55/94, Reinhard 
Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. I-
04165, ¶ 37. 
68 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37. 
69 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37. 
70 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37. 
71 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
72 Id. 
73 Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37. 
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the measure taken be rationally related to the interest pursued.74 Lackhoff75 
concludes that only when the measure is discriminatory will the Supreme 
Court ask if the measure is necessary to serve the public interest.76 In all 
other cases, the Supreme Court would only question whether the burden 
imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. 
However, it is dubious if this is a general rule. First, the Pike test only ap-
plies to statutes that regulate local public interests even-handedly and 
thereby excludes direct discriminatory regulations.77 Furthermore, the di-
vision between factual discriminatory measures and purely hindering 
measures is one of degree.78 Both the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the ECJ demonstrate this. In opposition to the majority of the Supreme 
Court in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., Justice Brennan and 
Justice Marshall treat the case as “protectionist in nature,”79 as it is de-
signed to discourage interstate traffic. In European Law, Advocate General 
Tizziano argues in SEVIC in favor of a mere restriction on the Freedom of 
Establishment.80 The ECJ, however, qualifies the rules governing an intra-
state merger by fusion as being “differen[t] in treatment ... which is likely 
to deter the exercise of the freedom of establishment.”81 
Nevertheless, the criterion as to whether a local public interest can be 
promoted with a lesser impact on interstate commerce is less often de-
ployed by the Supreme Court compared to the ECJ, as the U.S. judiciary 
highly respects the legislative authority of the states.82 
II. THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN COMPANIES 
In both jurisdictions, states have tried to apply local rules to pseudo-
foreign companies, arguing that there is a closer connection of these com-
panies to their jurisdiction.83 Pseudo-foreign companies are such companies 
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which are incorporated in one state, but do all of their business or most of 
all of their business in another state.84 In the U.S., in principle, the internal 
affairs doctrine is applicable, which corresponds to the incorporation doc-
trine in European terminology.85 This choice-of-law doctrine provides that 
the law of the state in which the corporation is incorporated governs the 
internal affairs of the company.86 However, laws in California and New 
York provide for the application of their state law on selected internal af-
fairs to companies incorporated in another state, as long as these compa-
nies mainly do business in their territory.87 
In the EU, two choice-of-law doctrines coexist. The incorporation doc-
trine provides for the application of the law of the state of incorporation, 
whereas the real seat doctrine provides for the application of the law of the 
state in which the head office of the company is situated and the main 
business decisions are put into practice.88 The main argument in favor of 
the real seat doctrine is that the place in which the main business decisions 
are made is the place in which the main contracting parties and the most 
important creditors are situated and, therefore, these stakeholders are safe-
guarded.89 This, however, creates obstacles to the company’s mobility. If 
the main place of business changes, a different law governs the internal 
affairs of the company, which can lead to deprivation of legal personality. 
The ECJ ruled on the treatment of foreign companies under the Freedom 
of Establishment three times.90 First, Danish authorities refused to register 
a branch of an English limited company trying to prevent the circumven-
tion of minimum capital requirements.91 In the second case, the German 
version of the real seat doctrine, which leads to denial of legal personality, 
was held to be in violation of community law.92 Finally, taking a position 
similar to that in Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code, the 
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Netherlands applied a law imposing additional requirements on pseudo-
foreign companies to the English company Inspire Art Limited.93 The follow-
ing section will assess the ability of states to legislate foreign companies 
under both constitutional frameworks. 
A. Foreign Companies Under the Interstate Commerce Clause 
It is a commonplace that companies in the U.S. are governed by the in-
ternal affairs doctrine.94 This enables companies to choose their legal forum 
and choose the most suitable state law to govern their company irrespec-
tive of their main place of business.95 But a closer look at company law in 
the United States reveals a slightly different picture96 regarding the choice-
of-law in the U.S. Inter alia, Section 2115 of the California Corporations 
Code led to an ongoing discussion about the treatment of pseudo-foreign 
companies under the Interstate Commerce Clause.97 Section 2115 of the 
California Corporations Code provides that corporations incorporated in an-
other member state are subject to certain internal governance rules if they 
operate substantially in California.98 A company operates substantially in 
California if more than 50% of the average of a corporation’s property, pay-
roll, and sales factors are allocated to California and more than one-half of 
its voting securities are held by persons having addresses in California pur-
suant to the books of the corporation.99 Foreign companies with outstand-
ing securities listed on a national securities exchange are excluded.100 
The objective of the law is to “prevent foreign corporations from cir-
cumventing Californian law while” their ties to California are stronger 
than to any other state.101 Therefore, the provision is applicable even if it is 
clear from the circumstances of the case that the company does not want to 
apply the California Corporations Code to its internal affairs.102 California 
is not the only state that enacted provisions of special treatment of foreign 
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companies and thereby derogated the internal affairs doctrine. Sections 
1319 and 1320 of the New York Business Corporation Law (NY BCL) pro-
vide that domestic rules, inter alia, on shareholder rights and mergers are 
applicable to foreign unlisted companies that conduct more than one-half of 
their business income activities in the State of New York.103 There has not 
been a U.S. Supreme Court decision on these statutes, even though the con-
stitutionality under the Interstate Commerce Clause is largely contested.104 
While Californian courts argued that Section 2115 of the California Corpo-
rations Code was constitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause,105 
Delaware’s courts refused to apply the Californian law and deemed it in 
violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause.106 
In Ross A. Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific,107 the Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia addressed the issue of the constitutionality of Section 2115 of the 
California Corporations Code.108 Ross Wilson sought a declaratory judg-
ment that Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., a company incorporated in 
Utah, fulfilled the qualification of a pseudo-foreign company under the 
California Corporations Code and therefore cumulative voting was manda-
tory.109 Except for being incorporated in Utah, the corporation had no busi-
ness connection with Utah.110 The principle place of business has been in 
California since 1971, the meetings of shareholders and directors took 
place in California, and all employees and all bank accounts have been in 
California.111 After declaring that the Californian law was constitutional 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court turned to the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.112 The balancing test, as established in Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., is stated as the relevant standard under the Commerce 
Clause.113 The Court found that the Californian statute regulates even-
handedly as it applies the same rules, which apply to corporations domi-
ciled in California, to pseudo-foreign corporations.114 The Court denied 
                                                 
103 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1319, 1320 (McKinney 2012). 
104 See J. Thomas Oldham, Regulating the Regulators: Limitations upon a State´s 
Ability to Regulate Corporations with Multi-State Contacts, 57 DENV. L.J. 345, 368–70 
(1980); DeMott, supra note 96, at 183–85, 197; Kruse, supra note 86; infra note 127. 
105 Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 861 (1982). 
106 See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1116 
(Del. 2005). 
107 Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 852. 
108 Id. at 854. 
109 Id. at 855. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 858. 
113 Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 858–59. 
114 Id. 
82 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:067 
that the law placed undue burdens on interstate commerce.115 It would deter 
corporations from reincorporating elsewhere “for the purpose of avoiding 
California’s protective corporate legislation, and thus to diminish the prac-
tice of ‘charter-mongering’ among states.”116 This would not contradict 
the Commerce Clause.117 Furthermore, there was no direct evidence that 
Section 2115 of California Corporation Code caused foreign companies to 
reduce property, payroll, and sales in California.118 Thus, the law would not 
have the purpose of deterring foreign corporations from doing business in 
California. Addressing the question of whether the law places undue bur-
dens on interstate commerce by creating legal uncertainty, the Court held 
that the Californian law would minimize uncertainty, since “[a] corpora-
tion can do a majority of its business in only one state at a time.”119 The 
potential for conflicting regulations applying to the same company would 
be “speculative and without substance.”120 The Court did not consider the 
public interest requirements and their proportionality but concluded that 
the effects on interstate commerce were “incidental, and minimal in rela-
tion to the purpose which that requirement is designed to achieve.”121 
In contrast to the Californian courts, Delawarean courts repeatedly 
held that the internal affairs doctrine would be mandated by the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.122 Consequently, in McDermott Inc. v. Harry Lewis 
and Nina Altmann,123 the Supreme Court of Delaware held the Panamanian 
law to be applicable to a company incorporated in Panama.124 The issue in 
the case was that Panamanian law allowed cross voting of shares between 
parent companies and their subsidiaries.125 However, this did not cause the 
Delaware Supreme Court to derogate from the internal affairs doctrine, 
since its application would be not only a question of conflict of laws, but 
also one of “serious constitutional proportions.”126 The Court relied heavily 
on the U.S. Supreme Court case CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,127 
which did not, however, involve the treatment of foreign companies by the 
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internal affairs doctrine, but the discretion of states to govern domestic 
corporations.128 Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court derived from 
this case that “the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional 
principles except in ‘the rarest situations.’”129 
In the case VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc.,130 the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the internal affairs doctrine is compre-
hensively safeguarded as a constitutional principle.131 VantagePoint, a ven-
ture capital firm, was a majority shareholder of a preferred class of shares 
of Examen, Inc., a company incorporated in Delaware.132 Examen, Inc. 
planned to merge with Reed Elsevier.133 If there had been a class vote, as 
mandated by Californian law, VantagePoint would have been able to block 
the merger.134 Therefore, VantagePoint argued that pursuant to Section 2115 
of the California Corporation Code, Californian law would apply.135 Both the 
Delaware Chancery Court and the Supreme Court of Delaware, however, 
applied the internal affairs doctrine with the result that Delawarean law 
was applicable.136 In its decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware argued 
that the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional principles 
such as the Due Process Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause.137 
Under the Commerce Clause, the court held, a state had no interest in reg-
ulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.138 
The issue of whether the laws on pseudo-foreign companies are consti-
tutional under the Commerce Clause is just as unresolved in legal debate. 
Stevens139 has criticized VantagePoint, arguing that the Delaware Supreme 
Court misinterpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law.140 Kruse141 and 
DeMott142 have argued that Section 2115 of the California Corporate Code 
violates the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause. They argue that the rule 
would place undue burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce, as 
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uniformity of corporate internal affairs would be necessary to ensure cer-
tainty in the companies’ dealings.143 The Californian law would leave a com-
pany in an unstable situation since its applicability would depend on the 
annual statements.144 Furthermore, Section 2115 of California Corporate 
Code would not regulate companies even-handedly since it excluded listed 
corporations.145 DeMott points out that the application of Californian law in 
itself does not constitute a public interest, at least in those cases, as signifi-
cant business by the company is allocated outside the state of California.146 
Kruse147 acknowledges that the Californian law safeguards public welfare in-
terests, but argues that no special creditor protection is needed as creditors 
usually can protect themselves in arm’s-length transactions.148 Regarding 
the protection of minority shareholders, such as in mandatory cumulative 
voting, the law would be excessive, as other states would view one share-
one vote rules as sufficient in order to protect minorities.149 
Oldham150 argued, on the contrary, that laws on pseudo-foreign com-
panies were constitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause, as long 
as legal certainty was safeguarded in the long run.151 Even though these laws 
would create a burden on interstate commerce, they would be justified under 
the balancing test. The states would have a public policy interest in pro-
tecting creditors and resident shareholders from fraudulent or unfair prac-
tices. The laws on foreign companies would promote these interests.152 
Furthermore, there would be no less burdensome alternative to pseudo-
foreign corporation laws.153 
In sum, the question of whether the internal affairs doctrine is a constitu-
tional principle mandated, inter alia, by the dormant Interstate Commerce 
Clause remains unresolved in the U.S. While the Delaware Supreme Court 
does not apply the Californian rule on foreign companies, arguing it is un-
constitutional under the Commerce Clause, the Californian courts apply 
Californian law to Delawarean companies.154 The fear that this will lead to a 
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“race[] to the courthouse[s]” in crucial cases seems to be well founded.155 
However, it must be remembered that both laws have existed in New York 
and California for several decades and, so far, no profound signs can be 
found that they are impeding interstate commerce.156 Moreover, the mere 
fact that the constitutional question remained unresolved for so long even 
though the legal arguments are obvious shows that the rules in question 
play a minor role in practice. The reason is that small companies have little 
incentive to incorporate in a state in which they do no business.157 The 
mandatory internal governance rules do not seem to offer incentives for 
incorporation in another state. 
B. Foreign Companies and the Freedom of Establishment 
The American debate about the constitutionality of rules on foreign 
companies finds its European counterpart in the discussion around the 
ECJ’s decisions in Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art. Here, the ECJ 
held that restrictions on foreign companies were inapplicable under the 
Freedom of Establishment. In Centros,158 the ECJ held that a Member 
State cannot refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accord-
ance with the law of another Member State, even if it was obvious from 
the facts of the case that the company was formed in order to circumvent 
minimum capital requirements.159 Centros Limited, a private limited com-
pany registered in England and Wales, wanted to register a branch in 
Denmark.160 The Danish authorities refused to register the branch, arguing 
that Centros was in fact seeking to establish a principal establishment in 
Denmark, since it does not trade in the UK.161 In the proceedings, the 
founders and shareholders of the company did not deny that the purpose 
of the formation of the company under English law was to avoid Danish 
legislation requiring that a minimum capital be paid up.162 The ECJ decided 
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that it violated the Freedom of Establishment to refuse to register a branch 
of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State 
in which it was registered, even if it conducted no business in the state of 
registration.163 The refusal of registration constituted an obstacle to the ex-
ercise of the Freedom of Establishment.164 Most importantly, according to 
the court, the circumvention of the minimum capital requirements did not 
constitute an abuse of European law.165 Instead, the Court stated, “the fact 
that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to 
form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the 
least restrictive ... cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of estab-
lishment.”166 This statement is seen as the signal for regulatory competition 
in European company law, which would lead to a “Delaware Effect.”167 
Unlike in the EU, in the U.S. a right to choose the most suitable regu-
latory framework is not seen as a right granted by the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.168 In contrast to Centros, the Court of Appeal of California states 
in Ross Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc.169 that reducing the 
“practice of ‘charter-mongering’” among states is not offending the poli-
cies of the Commerce Clause.170 
Furthermore, in Centros the refusal to register the branch because it 
did not pursue any business in England was held to be disproportional and 
could therefore not be justified by mandatory requirements of public inter-
est, such as to safeguard the interests of creditors.171 The measure was held 
to be unsuitable for protecting creditors, because creditors would not be 
more protected if the company pursued business in England.172 Secondly, 
creditors would be on notice that Centros Limited was a company gov-
erned by English law.173 According to the ECJ, there are less restrictive 
measures to protect creditors than refusing the registration of the branch; 
for example, it could be made “possible in law for public creditors to ob-
tain the necessary guarantees.”174 These last arguments are in line with the 
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argument put forward by Kruse, in relation to the Californian Corporate 
Code, that creditors can protect themselves in arm’s-length transactions.175 
Finally, according to the ECJ, the refusal to register a branch is held to 
be an excessive measure in order to combat fraud. A member state could 
adopt appropriate measures where the attempt of fraudulent behavior has 
been established in fact.176 In Überseering, the ECJ applied the reasoning 
of Centros to the primary Freedom of Establishment.177 Here, the real seat 
doctrine was contested.178 The proceedings involved a company registered in 
the Netherlands, Überseering BV, which pursued business in Germany.179 
According to the real seat doctrine, which is applicable in Germany, the 
law of the state in which the economic decisions are put into practice and 
the company’s actual center of administration is located determines the 
legal capacity of a company.180 The German courts found that the company’s 
center of administration was in Germany and that the company lacked legal 
capacity since it was not registered in Germany and did not fulfill the con-
ditions of German company law.181 The ECJ distinguishes between in-
bound situations, in which a company formed and registered under the law 
of one Member State sees its right of establishment infringed by the law of 
the host Member State, and outbound situations, in which a company 
formed and registered under the law of one Member State sees its rights of 
establishment infringed by the law of the state in which it was founded.182 
Accordingly, the ECJ held that the 
refusal by a host Member State (“B”) to recognise the legal capacity of 
a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State 
(“A”) in which it has its registered office on the ground ... that the com-
pany moved its actual centre of administration to Member State B ... 
constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment ....183 
This statement rendered the real seat doctrine inapplicable to European 
companies in inbound situations. 
The ECJ is tight-lipped when it comes to the question of whether the 
real seat doctrine could be justified by mandatory requirements. “[T]he 
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protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees 
and even the taxation authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject 
to certain conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment.”184 
However, none of these objectives could justify the denial of legal capacity 
in a host Member State.185 “Such a measure is tantamount to an outright 
negation of the freedom of establishment.”186 On a national level, the 
courts of jurisdictions that apply the real seat doctrine have reacted by ap-
plying the incorporation doctrine in relation to foreign companies from 
other EU Member States.187 
The situation in Centros and Überseering is significantly different 
from the situation concerning the laws on pseudo-foreign companies in the 
U.S. In Centros and Überseering, the states barred foreign companies com-
pletely from their territory so long as they would not incorporate accord-
ing to local law.188 A situation more comparable with the laws on foreign 
companies is the situation the ECJ had to deal with in Inspire Art. 
Inspire Art, a private limited company by shares, was formed under 
English law and registered in the United Kingdom.189 The Dutch authorities 
applied a law on formally foreign companies (wet op de formeel buitenlandse 
venootschappen—WFBV) and required registration as a formally foreign 
company and compliance with minimum share capital requirements.190 
Article 1 of the WFBV defines a “formally foreign company” as “a 
capital company formed under laws other than those of the Netherlands 
and having legal personality, which carries on its activities entirely or 
almost entirely in the Netherlands and also does not have any real 
connection with the State within which the law under which the 
company was formed applies.”191 
Netherland had argued that these companies “are fully recognised ... and 
are not refused registration,” but have to comply solely with a number of 
additional obligations.192 
                                                 
184 Id. ¶ 92. 
185 Id. ¶ 93. 
186 Id. 
187 See Überseering main proceedings: BGH VII ZR 370/98 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2003, 1461. 
188 See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919 at ¶ 95; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhversus-
og Selkabssyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459 at I-1497. 
189 See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire 
Art Ltd., 2003 S.L.G. I-10155, ¶ 34. 
190 Id. ¶ 23. 
191 Id. ¶ 22. 
192 Id. ¶ 99. 
2013] COMPANY LAW IN THE EU AND THE U.S. 89 
The ECJ had to decide if this law violated the Freedom of Establishment. 
The ECJ held that the Dutch law on formally foreign companies “has the 
effect of impeding the exercise ... of the freedom of establishment.”193 As 
far as the mandatory public interest of creditor protection being a possible 
justification, the ECJ repeated that “potential creditors are put on sufficient 
notice” that the company is not governed by Dutch law but by English 
law.194 A Member State would be entitled to prevent improper or fraudu-
lent exercise of the Freedom of Establishment.195 This, however, would 
not be the case in the situations envisaged by the “WFBV.”196 
C. Comparative Conclusions 
Even though there are strong similarities between the cases decided by 
the ECJ and those by the U.S. Supreme Court, the issues differ. The cases 
decided by the ECJ involved either the total denial of legal personality as 
in Überseering or the creditor protection by minimum capital require-
ments.197 The laws of California and New York in contrast are more con-
cerned with the protection of minority shareholders rights by specific local 
governance rules, which seem to have less disruptive effects on the common 
market.198 Secondly, in Inspire Art, the Dutch authorities forced Inspire 
Art to comply with the rules in order to keep on pursuing business in the 
Netherlands and thereby created a market entry barrier.199 The laws on 
foreign companies in the U.S. simply apply local law in disputes between 
shareholders.200 On another level, the laws on foreign companies in the U.S. 
states are broader in scope than the European laws under consideration by 
the ECJ. The European case law involved companies that pursued no 
business at all in the state of incorporation and almost all of their business 
in the host Member State.201 The laws on foreign companies in California 
and New York apply to situations in which the contact of the company 
with the state of incorporation includes real economic existence.202 In sum, 
the ECJ takes a stricter stand in comparison to the legal discussion in the 
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U.S. The ECJ upholds high standards when it comes to proportionality but 
leaves some scope for rules preventing fraud and protecting creditors and 
shareholders, as the protection of their interests are recognized as manda-
tory requirements of public interests.203 However, this scope has so far 
played no role in legal discussions, as the European case law led to the 
unlimited application of the incorporation doctrine in inbound cases at 
Member State level.204 Whereas the ECJ focuses on the question of pro-
portionality, the discussion in the U.S. is focused on the deterring effects 
of legal uncertainty arising from the application of the rules on foreign 
companies by the host state.205 Thus, the discussion in the U.S. is con-
cerned with the scope and limits of intervention by the host state when it 
comes to foreign companies, while the European discussion seems decided 
in favor of the unlimited application of the incorporation doctrine. 
III. LIMITS ON STATE POWER TO REGULATE 
DOMESTIC COMPANIES 
While the last section dealt with the treatment of foreign companies in 
states different from their state of incorporation, the following section will 
focus on the constitutional limits on the states’ ability to regulate compa-
nies incorporated under domestic law. 
In this regard, both the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court emphasize 
that companies are creatures of the law and that they only exist by virtue 
of the sovereignty by which they are created and that thereby determine 
their functioning.206 This argument is used in both jurisdictions to broaden 
significantly the states’ discretion in regulating companies. The U.S. Supreme 
Court thereby gave the states significant scope to enact laws that have pro-
hibiting effects on take-overs.207 The ECJ on the other hand gave Member 
States the right to require from companies that they keep their head office and 
the place of registration in the same place.208 Two lines of comparison can be 
drawn. Firstly, the use of the creature argument under the outbound Freedom of 
Establishment is compared to the U.S. case law. Secondly, it can be questioned 
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if the ECJ would come to the same conclusions as the Supreme Court in re-
spect to the Freedom of Capital and Establishment, when it comes to possible 
restrictions of foreign investors’ access to capital markets.209 
A. Domestic Companies and the Interstate Commerce Clause 
Two cases of the U.S. Supreme Court are central when it comes to states’ 
discretion to regulate domestic companies under the Commerce Clause. Firstly, 
in Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Illinois Business Take-Over Act was declared in-
valid under the Commerce Clause.210 Second, in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America, significant discretion was given to the states.211 Both state laws in 
question included provisions, which had deterring effects on take-overs and 
share acquisitions.212 In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,213 the Illinois Business Take-
Over Act required the tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the 
target company, but not the shareholders of the target company of its intended 
offer, twenty days before the offer became effective. In that way the manage-
ment of the target company could inform its shareholders about the offer, with-
out the interference of the offeror.214 
The rule should apply not only to target companies incorporated in Illinois, 
but also to companies of which shareholders from Illinois own 10% of the 
class of securities subject to the take-over offer, have their principal office in 
Illinois, or have at least 10% of their state’s capital represented in the state.215 
The law therefore regulated foreign companies as well. However, the regu-
lation on foreign companies was not the decisive reason for the U.S. Supreme 
Court declaring the rule invalid under the Commerce Clause. 
Instead, the Court held the Illinois Act was already invalid, since it di-
rectly regulated interstate commerce.216 Since the transactions of shares in a 
take-over normally take place across state lines or even wholly outside the 
State of Illinois, and the Act would apply even if not a single shareholder 
were a resident of Illinois, the Act constituted a direct restraint on interstate 
commerce.217 Additionally, the invalidation under the Pike test did not rely 
heavily on the reasoning that the Act regulated foreign companies.218 Rather, 
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the Supreme Court used this as a counter-argument to the alleged interest in 
regulating companies incorporated in Illinois.219 The Court rejected the 
argument that Illinois has an interest in regulating the internal affairs of a 
corporation incorporated under its law by stating that this would be 
“somewhat incredible, since the Illinois Act applies to tender offers for any 
corporation for which 10% of the outstanding shares are held by Illinois 
residents.”220 Illinois would not have an “interest in regulating the internal 
affairs of foreign corporations.”221 
The Court stressed the burdens on interstate commerce created by the 
power of the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender offer.222 
“The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, a pro-
cess which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered.”223 The 
Court then goes on to reason that the rule was excessive in two aspects, of 
which only one was the effect on foreign companies.224 The other was that 
the Court was unconvinced that the Act enhanced the position of the 
shareholders;225 the Court, therefore, did not accept there was a legitimate 
interest of resident shareholder protection. 
In CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a state has no interest in protecting non-resident shareholders of non-
resident companies, but rejected that a state has no interest in providing 
for shareholder rights in domestic corporations. 226 Thus, the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself narrowed the interpretation of Edgar v. MITE Corp. to the de-
cisive argument that the Illinois Act regulated foreign companies as well 
as Illinois companies.227 CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America228 dealt with 
Chapter 42 of the Indiana Business Corporation Law (BCL), which ap-
plies to corporations that are incorporated in Indiana,229 and which have 
specified levels of shareholders within Indiana,230 and have not opted out 
of the chapter.231 This law provides that the acquisition of shares above a 
specific threshold (control shares) does not confer voting rights unless a 
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majority of all pre-existing disinterested shareholders so agree at the next 
regularly scheduled meeting. The thresholds are 1/5, 1/3, and 1/2 of the 
voting shares.232 Dynamics Corp. of America tried to increase their share-
holding in CTS, which was subject to Chapter 42 of Indiana BCL, from 
9.6% to 27.5%, by announcing a tender offer.233 Holding that Chapter 42 
was not pre-empted by the Williams Act, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether the Chapter violates the Interstate Commerce Clause.234 
Thereby, the Court first of all denied there were any discriminatory effects 
of the Chapter.235 The Court rejected the position that the rule discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, as “nothing in the Indiana Act imposes 
a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on similarly situated 
Indiana offerors.”236 Furthermore, the law would not create undue burdens 
on interstate commerce.237 Since “[a] corporation is an artificial being, in-
visible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law ... it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.”238 
Therefore, Indiana would have the authority to regulate domestic corpora-
tions, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.239 
The Court recognized the need for a liquid capital market and the ability of 
companies to draw foreign companies to them.240 However, “[t]his benefi-
cial free market system depends ... upon the fact that a corporation—except 
in the rarest situations—is organized under, and governed by, the law of a 
single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its incor-
poration.”241 It is “an accepted part of the business landscape ... for States 
to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights 
that are acquired by purchasing their shares.”242 The Court’s reasoning 
was based upon the tremendous trust reposed in the states as the creators 
of companies.243 According to this reasoning, interstate commerce of 
shares takes place within the framework established by state law to regu-
late companies.244 Therefore, the hampering effects the rule has on tender 
offers and, thereby, on take-overs in general do not stand in contrast to the 
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Interstate Commerce Clause.245 “[T]he very commodity that is traded in 
the ‘market for corporate control’—the corporation—is one that owes its 
existence and attributes to state law.”246 The U.S. Supreme Court does not 
see it as its task to liberalize the market in this respect. Instead, it is 
stressed that “[t]he Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to 
any particular economic theory”247 and that the Court is “not inclined ‘to 
second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers.’”248 The Supreme 
Court thereby gives states an almost unlimited discretion to regulate com-
panies which are incorporated in their state.249 
The decision correlates to the earlier decision to exclude companies 
from the Privileges and Immunities Clause.250 In both situations, the Court re-
lies heavily on the argument that corporations are creatures of local law and, 
therefore, have only the rights given to them by the law as its creator.251 
Accordingly, shareholders do not have a natural right of voting power in a 
company, just as a company has only the rights which are given to it by the 
state’s legislation.252 Even more remarkable is that the U.S. Supreme Court 
did not address the fact that companies under Chapter 42-5 of the Indiana 
BCL could opt out of the provisions.253 The Court could have reasoned 
that the burdens on the foreign shareholder in the Indiana Corporation 
could be regarded as having been imposed, not by the state, but by the 
shareholders of the corporation. The application of the Commerce Clause 
would then be limited to mandatory state law. 
B. Domestic Companies and EU Freedoms 
Constraints on the power of Member States to regulate domestic com-
panies under the legal framework of the EU are a result of the outbound 
Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom of Capital.254 Both freedoms 
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give rise to comparison between the described case law of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the judgments of the ECJ. In Cartesio, the ECJ restated the argu-
ment already used in Daily Mail, that companies are “creatures of national 
law,” in order to give Member States the discretion to require companies 
formed under local law to keep their head office at the place of registration.255 
It is questionable, however, whether the creature argument works in a sim-
ilar manner in the constitutional framework of the United States and the 
European Union. Further, it has to be questioned if the Freedom of Capital 
and Establishment prevent states from creating barriers to the market for 
corporate control, which are allowed under the CTS Corporation case law 
in the U.S.256 The European framework would then be considerably more 
market integrating than would the U.S. framework. 
1. The Creature Doctrine in European Law 
The argument that, unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of 
the law can be found not only in the U.S. constitutional decisions on state 
company law, but in the legal doctrine of the Freedom of Establishment in 
one of the early cases of the ECJ on that matter.257 Neglected and disdained 
in the decade after the Centros decision, the argument found a great re-
naissance in Cartesio.258 Both decisions touch on the issue of the relation-
ship between Freedom of Establishment and choice-of-law doctrines in 
outbound situations.259 
In Daily Mail, a public limited company incorporated in England 
transferred its head office to the Netherlands, which did not result in a loss 
of legal personality.260 However, English law requires the application of 
the tax regime of the place where the company’s central management is 
located.261 Yet, the UK Treasury would not accept the movement of the 
head office, proposing that Daily Mail should at least pay a part of the taxes 
to the British authorities.262 The ECJ, while acknowledging an outbound 
Freedom of Establishment for companies in principal, nevertheless con-
cluded that the measures in question imposed no restriction on the out-
bound Freedom of Establishment of companies.263 The Court stressed that 
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the consent of the Treasury is only needed when a company transfers its 
central management out of the United Kingdom while maintaining its sta-
tus as an English company.264 “In that regard it should be borne in mind 
that, unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in the 
present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only 
by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incor-
poration and functioning.”265 By referring to the different rules of the 
Member States concerning the movement of the head office, the ECJ gave 
Member States the right to restrict the movement of the head office in sit-
uations where companies are and want to remain governed by the law of 
their home jurisdiction.266 
It remained unclear, however, if the real seat doctrine had similarly been 
excluded from the scope of the outbound Freedom of Establishment.267 In 
its extreme manifestation, the real seat doctrine leads to the dissolution of 
the company if the head office is moved to another real seat jurisdiction.268 
Therefore, Advocate General Maduro, in his opinion in Cartesio, argued 
that the real seat doctrine should be found inapplicable under the outbound 
Freedom of Establishment.269 The ECJ, however, did not follow his opinion.270 
Cartesio dealt with a company formed under Hungarian law, which trans-
ferred its head office to Gallarate, Italy.271 Following the real seat doctrine, 
Hungarian law prohibited a company incorporated in Hungary from trans-
ferring its head office abroad while continuing to be subject to Hungarian 
law as its personal law.272 The Court governing the commercial register 
therefore rejected the motion to enter Gallarate as the new location of the 
head office.273 “[S]uch a transfer of [the head office] would require first, that 
the company cease to exist and, then, that the company re-incorporate itself 
in compliance with the law of the country where it wishes to establish its 
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new seat.”274 The ECJ addressed this issue, repeating its statement made in 
Daily Mail: “[C]ompanies are creatures of national law and exist only by 
virtue of the national legislation which determines their incorporation and 
functioning.”275 In accordance, the Member States have the right to define 
the connecting factors that make the legal entity a company under the law 
of the Member State.276 The definition of the legal entities as companies, 
which enjoy the Freedom of Establishment, is therefore a “preliminary 
matter which ... can only be resolved by the applicable national law.”277 It 
is thus national law, which defines under what conditions a company is 
“formed in accordance with the law of a Member State” (Article 54 (1) 
TFEU).278 This includes the power of a Member State to prohibit a com-
pany formed under local law from moving its head office abroad.279 The 
ECJ recognizes in return the right of a company to convert itself, “without 
prior winding-up or liquidation,” into a company governed by another 
law.280 In this respect, European company law is approaching the situation 
found in the U.S. The states have large defining powers; however, compa-
nies enjoy the possibility of reincorporating in another state.281 
2. Comparative Conclusions 
Firstly, one has to note a paradox: the reasoning used in the American 
legal discussion to explain the internal affairs doctrine is used by the ECJ to 
justify the existence of the real seat doctrine under the Freedom of Estab-
lishment.282 Secondly, as pointed out earlier, in the American context the 
creature argument can rely on a consistent distinction between natural per-
sons and companies.283 Companies under the constitutional framework of 
the U.S. are treated unlike natural persons, as they cannot rely on the 
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Privileges and Immunities Clause, nor are similar rights granted by the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.284 In contrast, the EU Treaties and the ECJ 
emphasize the correlation of natural persons and companies.285 The EU 
Treaties treat companies, as defined in Article 48, “in the same way as 
natural persons who are nationals of Member States.”286 Therefore, an argu-
ment beginning with the words “unlike natural persons” must force con-
testation in the European Law context.287 
C. The Indiana Corporation from a European Law Perspective 
From a comparative point of view, it is interesting to assess if the rule 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as constitutional in CTS would comply 
with the EC Freedom of Capital and Establishment, if a European member 
state were to enact such a rule. To reiterate, Chapter 42 of the Indiana Business 
Corporation Law provides that the acquisition of shares above a specific 
threshold does not include voting rights unless a majority of all preexisting 
disinterested shareholders so agree at their next regularly scheduled meeting.288 
This rule applies to companies incorporated in Indiana that have not opted 
out of the provision.289 
1. Freedom of Capital 
The ECJ decided on similar laws in its so-called golden share judgments.290 
These judgments involved special rights granted mostly to state authorities in 
former state-owned enterprises. In Commission/France,291 a rule applicable 
to the Société National Elf-Aquitaine provided that any shareholding ex-
ceeding the ceiling of 1/10, 1/5 or 1/3 of a company’s capital or of its vot-
ing rights must first be approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs.292 
The ECJ states that direct investment in the form of participation in an 
undertaking by means of shareholding or securities acquisition constitutes 
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capital movement.293 Further, the rule constitutes a restriction on the free 
movement of capital.294 
Even though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment, 
they are liable to impede the acquisition of shares in the undertakings 
concerned and to dissuade investors in other Member States from 
investing in the capital of those undertakings. They are therefore liable, 
as a result, to render the free movement of capital illusory.295 
Concerning justification for the restriction of the freedom of capital, 
the ECJ recognized the public interest of maintaining a consistent supply of 
petroleum in the event of a crisis.296 However, the requirement for general 
approval of the Minister was held to be disproportionate, as there was no 
indication under what circumstances the authorization could be refused.297 
The facts in Commission/Portugal298 were similar. Here, the relevant 
law provided that the shareholding of all non-Portuguese investors should 
be limited to 25% of the capital.299 Furthermore, the prior authorization of the 
Minister of Financial Affairs was required for every acquisition of shares 
representing more than 10% of the voting capital.300 The ECJ decided that 
the limitation of 25% of capital for foreign investors was discriminatory 
and, therefore, violated the free movement of capital.301 Regarding the re-
quirement for authorization by the Minister of Financial Affairs, the ECJ 
repeated the same ruling as in Commission v. France.302 
In Commission/UK,303 the Articles of Association of the privatized 
British Airport Authority provided for a general voting cap of 15%.304 
Secondly, a special share was created which could only be held by the 
Secretaries of State.305 This special share involved special decision rights on 
important transactions.306 The ECJ came to the conclusion that the mea-
sures restricted the free movement of capital, as it limited the acquisition 
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of shareholdings and restricted “the scope for participating effectively in 
the management of a company or in its control.”307 Even though the re-
strictions would be non-discriminatory in nature, “they affect the position 
of a person acquiring a shareholding as such and are thus liable to deter 
investors from other Member States from making such investments and, 
consequently, affect access to the market.”308 
In Volkswagen,309 the Volkswagen Law provided for a 20% voting 
cap, a qualified majority of 80% instead of 75%, and special board nomi-
nation powers for the Federal Republic of Germany and the state of Lower 
Saxony.310 The ECJ qualified these measures as a state measure, even 
though Germany argued that the law should historically be viewed as a 
private law contract.311 The exercise of legislative powers is a manifesta-
tion of state power par excellence.312 The Court held that the qualified ma-
jority together with the voting cap would limit the possibility of other 
shareholders participating effectively in the company and, therefore, “deter 
direct investors from other Member States.”313 The same was held with 
regard to the special board nomination powers.314 
In the European case law, unlike Chapter 42 of the Indiana BCL, a state 
entity was directly involved.315 The companies in question were partly state-
held and there was either a general voting cap or the requirement that a spe-
cial state authority be granted in the case of a share acquisition.316 In contrast, 
the decision to attach voting rights to the acquired shares is left to the re-
maining shareholders in the Indiana Corporation.317 However, this Article 
ventures to argue that a rule like Chapter 42 of the Indiana BCL would vio-
late the Freedom of Capital and Establishment, considering that the case 
law describes it as constituting a state measure that deters direct investors. 
It has to be pointed out that the judgments were not in any way swayed by 
the fact that a state was directly involved as a shareholder of the companies 
in the cases discussed.318 In contrast, in Commission/France, the potential 
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exercise of public security policy serves as a possible justification.319 The 
issue is further considered in Commission/UK, as the UK Government ar-
gued that the restrictions arose as a result of the normal operation of company 
law.320 The ECJ rejected this argument by treating the articles of associa-
tion as a state act instead of a private party agreement.321 In this respect, the 
Court relied on the fact that the articles of association had to be approved 
by the Secretary of State pursuant to the Airports Act 1986.322 Similarly, 
in the case of the Indiana Corporation, the restriction derives from a state 
law, and not from a private party agreement.323 Less clear in this respect is 
the Volkswagen decision, as the Court only held the 20% voting cap in com-
bination with the 80% supermajority liable to hinder the free movement of 
capital.324 However, the Court qualified the Volkswagen law clearly as a state 
measure, as “the exercise of legislative power by the national authorities duly 
authorised to that end is a manifestation par excellence of State power.”325 
A more controversial question is whether a default rule, like Chapter 42 
of the Indiana BCL, can escape control under the Freedom of Capital prin-
ciple. It has been argued that default rules in private law are not subject to 
control under the EU Freedoms in general, since private parties can escape 
them.326 However, excluding default rules from control under the EU Free-
doms would dilute the effectiveness of EU law. Therefore, excluding de-
fault rules from the scope of the EU Freedoms is not demonstrative, as the 
effet utile is a general principle of community law.327 EU law even requires 
Member States to abstain from any measure, which could hinder the exer-
cise of the four market freedoms.328 In fact, default rules do not give com-
plete freedom of choice to the contracting parties, but are biased towards a 
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certain solution.329 The contracting partner that wants to derogate from the 
default rule has to incur the burdens of alteration. This is even more so in 
company law, as a shareholder who wants to opt out of the regime would 
have to incur additional costs to initiate a coalition among other share-
holders and overcome the problems of rational apathy and collective action. 
This controversial issue in European law was not even considered by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in regard to Chapter 42 of the Indiana BCL.330 Finally, 
it is open to question if a European version of Chapter 42 of the Indiana 
BCL would be treated differently from the rules in the golden share cases, 
since it is for the remaining shareholders to decide whether voting rights 
are attached to the acquired shares. 
Firstly, the factual uncertainty this rule creates, which deters investors 
from acquiring shares, suggests this rule’s nonconformity with the free-
dom of capital. For the ECJ, the de facto resulting impediments on the 
single market are what matter the most. Secondly, in the light of the rea-
soning of the ECJ in Commission/France, it is even more unlikely that 
such a rule could be tolerated under the free movement of capital. The ECJ 
stresses the factual and legal uncertainty the investor faces, if a share ac-
quisition is subject to the authority of a state authority.331 This factual un-
certainty is aggravated if it is for the shareholders to decide, since unlike 
state entities, their discretion is not even restricted by general constitutional 
principles such as, for instance, equal treatment. 
2. Freedom of Establishment 
Even though the parallel application of the Freedom of Establishment 
and the Freedom of Capital is still contentious, the majority of legal schol-
arship and the ECJ favor a parallel application of both freedoms.332 In 
such a case, the above reasoning applies in the same way for the Freedom 
of Establishment,333 with the result that a rule like Chapter 42 of Indiana 
BCL would violate the Freedom of Establishment if it were enacted by an 
EU Member State. A direct investment, such as an investment targeted at 
entrepreneurial activity in the company, constitutes an establishment under 
Article 49 TFEU.334 Direct investments are concerned with the question at 
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hand, since those are the investments in which voting rights matter.335 
Doubts remain whether, here as well, the ECJ could use the argument that 
companies are creatures of the law. However, the application of this rea-
soning by the ECJ so far is limited to the choice-of-law doctrines.336 
3. Comparative Conclusion 
In sum, the European framework seems to be significantly more re-
strictive and leaves the Member States with less power to regulate their 
companies. This is mainly because the American system lacks the right of 
free movement of capital when it comes to investments in companies.337 
Whereas, the TFEU grants this right explicitly in the freedom of capital 
and implicitly in the Freedom of Establishment, the Interstate Commerce 
Clause does not grant a right to freedom of investments.338 According to 
CTS, investors therefore only have the right to invest in U.S. companies as 
state law grants it.339 
Further, unlike the U.S. system, the division between natural persons 
and companies as creatures of the law is not implemented in a consistent 
manner.340 This is due to the equation of companies and natural persons in 
Article 54 TFEU.341 Even though it is obvious that natural persons and 
companies differ in many respects, neither the ECJ nor the legislator, nor 
legal doctrine, has addressed the matter in broader scope. 
IV. REASONS AND LESSONS 
On the basis of the observations made beforehand, it has to be con-
cluded that the ECJ’s interpretation of the Freedoms of Establishment and 
Capital limits the powers to regulate company law at the state level more 
severely than does the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the dormant Inter-
state Commerce Clause.342 This can be seen in the three areas assessed. 
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Firstly, constitutional legal doctrine in the U.S. seems to tolerate the 
special treatment of pseudo-foreign companies by host states, as this treat-
ment is seen as imposing little hindrance on interstate commerce and the com-
mon market.343 Secondly, U.S. constitutional law consistently rejects every 
notion of corporate citizenship.344 In accordance, in creating companies the 
states have broad discretion to restrict the abilities of the companies.345 
Finally, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not entail the right to free 
movement of investment.346 What are the reasons for these differences? 
What lessons can the EU learn from the legal debate in the U.S.? 
A. Foreign Companies 
When it comes to the question of why the U.S. legal system can be 
more lenient as far as the special treatment of pseudo-foreign companies 
by New York and California statutes is concerned, two differences matter 
the most. First of all, the incentives for small companies to incorporate in 
another Member State rather than in the home state seem to be minimal in 
the U.S. compared to the EU.347 In the EU, high minimum capital require-
ments in some Member States are a major incentive for small companies 
to incorporate in another Member State.348 The U.S. has a more uniform 
company law in this respect. Interestingly, as regards larger companies, 
European law has harmonized minimum capital requirements in Article 6 
of the 2nd Company Law Directive.349 Larger firms, however, are unlikely 
to do business in only one state and therefore seldom conflict with the 
rules on pseudo-foreign companies.350 
Hence, regulatory competition is turned upside down in the EU when 
compared to the U.S. Large disparities remain with regard to small com-
panies, where the development of pseudo-foreign companies is likely, 
whereas the rules for larger companies are harmonized.351 The comparison 
shows further that in certain areas of company law, such as the question of 
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minimum capital requirements, convergence is needed; in other areas such 
as internal corporate governance, however, diverse solutions will have 
fewer negative effects on the functioning of a common market.352 
Whereas the U.S. courts leave the issue of the special treatment of for-
eign companies by California and New York unresolved, the ECJ has taken 
a strict stand. The reasons for the different approaches to the treatment of 
foreign companies by the host state could easily be found in historical and 
cultural arguments. The Single European Market is still young compared 
to the common market of the U.S. Moreover, the EU is culturally more 
diverse than the U.S. Each Member State brings with it a different legal 
tradition deeply rooted in cultural beliefs.353 Accordingly, the company 
laws in the U.S. could evolve in an existing common market, whereas the 
company laws in Europe first have to be accommodated. 
Buxbaum354 argues in this context that unlike the U.S., the EU institu-
tions need a more activist approach, as the Single European Market is still 
undergoing development.355 He argues that the ECJ will in the long run 
take a more lenient view on the choice-of-law doctrine, resulting in a theory 
of super-addition in which broad exceptions, such as the Californian rules 
on foreign companies, are added to the incorporation doctrine.356 It remains 
to be seen if the ECJ will be more lenient as integration advances. However, 
it is unlikely that the ECJ would tolerate laws like those of California and 
New York in the EU, considering the strict and clear stand it took on laws 
governing pseudo-foreign companies in the Inspire Art decision. Even more 
unlikely, at present, is that an EU member state would enact such laws, 
since it would fear the strict actions of both the EU Commission and the 
ECJ.357 The ECJ has set a standard with its decisions, from which it will 
be hard to derogate. 
The perspective this Article takes is, unlike Buxbaum’s, neither histor-
ical nor cultural, but relies on the functioning of a common market. This 
Article argues that the legal differences matter. Certain areas of company 
law need to converge, whereas other areas of company law can be more di-
verse without creating burdens on a single market structure. The question 
                                                 
352 Peter Zumbansen, Eurpoean Corporate Law and National Divergencies: The Case 
of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 867, 884 (2004). 
353 Mark Peil, The Uneasy Fit Between Legal Traditions and the Political Economy of 
Regional Trade, 8 GERMAN L.J. 547, 549 (2007) (reviewing FRANCESCO DUINA, THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRICTION OF FREE TRADE (2006)). 
354 BUXBAUM, supra note 342, at 160. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. 
357 A qualified breach of community law can lead to state liability. See generally Case 
C-479/93, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1995 E.C.R. I-3861. 
106 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:067 
of minimum capital is especially crucial for the Single European Market in 
two aspects. It creates not a factual but a legal entry requirement into the 
markets.358 Secondly, it affects companies in terms of formation when they 
are most flexible and least compliant to accepting charges and restrictions.359 
The rules in California and New York in contrast are much softer in their 
effect. They allow companies to enter the market and accept them as legal 
entities, but require the application of certain internal governance rules.360 
More importantly, there are few incentives to create a pseudo-foreign 
company in the U.S. In the U.S., the problem of pseudo-foreign companies 
was largely resolved by the factual convergence. U.S. law accidentally 
avoided361 the problem of pseudo-foreign companies. Since low capitali-
zation requirements prevail in the company laws of the U.S., the incen-
tives to incorporate in a state different from the main place of business are 
low.362 In contrast, different minimum capital requirements in the EU pro-
vide incentives to form pseudo-foreign companies with no economic con-
nection to the country of incorporation.363 
On the other hand, internal governance rules, like those in California 
and New York, do not seem to create such incentives. Besides issues of 
legal certainty, there are no visible disruptive effects on the functioning of 
the common market.364 The reason the U.S. constitutional doctrine is more 
lenient when it comes to the treatment of foreign companies by the host 
state can be found, therefore, not in different approaches to the functioning 
of the common market, but in the subject matter. This leads to the argu-
ment that convergence on the question of minimum capital requirements is 
needed from a common market perspective, whereas divergence in respect 
to governance rules can be tolerated. 
What lessons can be learned from this insight? Firstly, one should be 
cautious in transferring the same strictness with which the ECJ rejected 
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the minimum capital requirements in other inbound cases. Secondly, con-
vergence eventually has to be reached on minimum capital requirements 
across Europe.365 Whether this is achieved by legislation via harmonization 
or thorough regulatory competition is merely a question of policy. As long 
as minimum requirements exist in some Member States, these Member 
States create incentives for entrepreneurs to evade the regime by founding 
a company in another jurisdiction.366 This fosters regulatory arbitrage and 
exposes business partners and creditors to an unfamiliar legal regime.367 
Pseudo-foreign companies are created, which have no real economic contact 
with their state of incorporation. Convergence is therefore preferable. This 
insight stands in stark contrast to harmonized law in the EU, which focuses 
on large companies.368 Large companies, however, normally have business 
contacts in many states and therefore are unlikely to be pseudo-foreign com-
panies. Convergence has been created where it is less needed, whereas harmo-
nization on smaller companies, which are more likely to be pseudo-foreign 
companies, was neglected. Finally, internal corporate governance rules such 
as cumulative voting rights and decision-making procedures do not have the 
same hampering effects on the functioning of the internal market compared 
to minimum capital requirements and can, therefore, be treated differently.369 
B. Domestic Companies 
The comparison shows that the states in the U.S. enjoy broad discre-
tion when regulating companies formed and incorporated in accordance 
with their law. Two major differences in law can be found. The U.S. con-
stitutional law consistently rejects every notion of corporate citizenship.370 
Further, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not entail a right to freedom 
of investments as the EU freedom of capital does.371 This results in the 
ECJ exercising stricter scrutiny and restricting Member States’ power to 
regulate domestic companies more than the U.S. Supreme Court.372 
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This Article argues that this, as well, is not because of the ECJ’s activist 
approach, but is rooted in the very notion of the EU’s constitutional set-up. 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the EU Treaty does accept the concept of a 
company being a normal market participant.373 At the same time, the EU 
Treaty acknowledges the capital market’s importance to the economic system 
and, therefore, grants forceful rights to the free movement of capital.374 
The reasons for these different approaches lie most obviously in the con-
stitutional documents and the time in which they were created. Whereas 
corporate personality had to be introduced as a new concept in the U.S. 
constitutional framework, the legal capacity of companies was an estab-
lished idea at the time the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957.375 The EU 
could, therefore, set up a more modern framework, relying on their experi-
ences with the functioning of a modern market economy. 
These experiences are twofold. Firstly, companies are regarded not so 
much as creatures of the law but as normal market participants, like natural 
persons.376 Therefore, the Freedom of Establishment of companies does 
not enjoy special treatment under the EU Treaty.377 Instead, it is simply 
stated that companies are to be treated the same way as natural persons, 
who are nationals of a Member State.378 Secondly, the importance of the 
capital market to the economy was obvious to the founders of the Europe-
an Community.379 This led to strong rights pertaining to freedom and di-
rect investments under the EU Treaties. 
Thus, when it comes to an efficient capital market, the EU Treaty has set 
up a more modern constitutional framework than the U.S. does. Moreover, the 
EU Treaty challenges legal doctrine by the simple equation of companies and 
natural persons in Article 54 TFEU. In comparison to the U.S. constitutional 
framework under which much broader rights of freedom have to be granted 
to companies, the argument that companies are unlike natural persons as they 
are only creatures of the law finds only limited textual basis in the Treaty.380 
The ECJ could use this argument in Cartesio and Daily Mail only with 
regard to the connecting factors a Member State uses to determine which 
companies are domestic. Here, the Court could rely on the three connecting 
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factors, which Article 54 TFEU explicitly treats equally: registered office, 
central administration, and principal place of business.381 Taking the simple 
equation of natural persons and companies into account, it is unlikely that 
the creature argument could be used in order to broaden the discretion of 
Member States in other fields of company law. On the other hand, a basic 
truth lies in the argument that companies do not exist naturally, but are 
created by rules. The pure existence of companies relies on the lawmaker. 
Compared to the U.S. constitutional system, the TFEU creates a tension 
between the equation of companies and natural persons in Article 54 
TFEU and the fact that the existence of companies relies on laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The comparative analysis of the constitutional frameworks of the EU 
and the U.S. in regard to state powers pertaining to company law has shown 
that the U.S. constitutional framework is more lenient than the EU’s. Manda-
tory rules on pseudo-foreign companies are tolerated in the U.S. Concerning 
the regulation of domestic companies, the U.S. gives broad discretion to 
the states by consistently rejecting the concept of a corporate citizenship. 
The more lenient approach is not due to an activist approach of the ECJ 
or due to an activist phase of integration. Instead, these differences are 
rooted in the specific legal set-up of the two common markets. In respect 
to foreign companies, different minimum capital requirements in the EU 
offer incentives for the creation of pseudo-foreign companies. In contrast, 
the U.S. constitutional framework shows that different governance rules do 
not seem to create large burdens on the functioning of the common market. 
Concerning the discretion granted to states to regulate domestic companies, 
the U.S. constitutional framework rejects any notion of corporate citizen-
ship and therefore can deploy the argument that companies are creatures of 
state law in order to grant states larger powers. The TFEU, in contrast, ex-
plicitly equates natural persons and companies, which has led to a stronger 
scrutiny of Member State law in the long run. European legal doctrine is 
faced with the paradox that the TFEU equates natural persons and companies, 
whereas in reality companies differ from natural persons in many respects. 
Finally, the broad discretion left to the states while regulating domestic 
companies can have hampering effects on the common market, as can be 
seen in the cases regarding the takeover market and the Indiana corpora-
tion. The EU constitutional framework is in better shape to address these 
problems and can thereby create an increasingly efficient capital market. 
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